TEHRAN- For Iran, BRICS is not merely an economic pact; it is a large market and a set of financial, commercial, and transit routes that, if their capacities are activated, can open a new chapter in the country’s foreign trade.
According to Mehr News Agency, Iran attends the BRICS summit in India at a time when the group has become one of the most important centers of Global South trade. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, BRICS members’ merchandise exports reached about $6 trillion in 2024 and their imports about $5 trillion, while intra-group trade rose to about $1.2 trillion.
These figures show that for Iran, BRICS is not merely a political coalition; rather, it encompasses a set of major consumer, producer, energy-exporting economies and capital-market owners. Iran also became a full member of the group in 2024, alongside China, India, Russia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa.
* Iran’s trade with BRICS; a number more important than membership itself
The reality is that even before its official membership, Iran conducted a significant portion of its foreign trade with BRICS member states. Data published in the BRICS economic bulletin show that Iran’s customs exports to BRICS countries reached about $23.7 billion in the Iranian year 1403 (ended in March 2025) while Iran’s imports from these countries in the same period were about $38.8 billion.
Thus, Iran’s trade with BRICS, before being a potential opportunity, is already an important part of the country’s foreign trade reality. The main question begins here: to what extent can Iran’s membership in this group change the quality of this trade?
The challenge of Iran’s trade with BRICS member states is not merely finding a buyer or seller; in many cases, the main problem goes back to money transfers, transaction costs, insurance, transportation, banking restrictions, and sanctions risk.
From this perspective, the importance of BRICS’s financial track for Iran is no less than increasing trade volume itself.
One of the most important economic topics at this year’s BRICS summit was developing payment mechanisms and reducing friction in exchanges among members. India, as BRICS chair in 2026, is now pursuing a proposal to connect the central bank digital currencies of the group’s members to facilitate cross-border payments. This plan continues BRICS efforts to increase interoperability of members’ payment systems.
For Iran, the importance of this issue is clear. Any mechanism that can reduce the cost and time of foreign trade settlement can directly affect the possibility of expanding exports and imports.
Of course, this path still faces serious obstacles. Reuters has reported that geopolitical disagreements among members and even the severing of financial relations between Iran and the UAE, along with the need for currency swap mechanisms to manage trade imbalances, have made implementing such plans difficult.
Therefore, expectations from BRICS should not be the creation of a “common currency” or the overnight elimination of the dollar; rather, in the short term, reducing settlement costs, greater use of local currencies, and connecting payment systems can be a more practical achievement for members’ trade.
Expectations from BRICS should not be the creation of a “common currency” or the overnight elimination of the dollar; rather, in the short term, reducing settlement costs, greater use of local currencies, and connecting payment systems can be a more practical achievement for members’ trade.
Among BRICS members, China remains Iran’s most important trading partner. World Trade Organization data show that in 2024, China accounted for 26 percent of Iran’s imports and 26 percent of Iran’s exports.
But this high concentration has another side; if BRICS is to become a tool for diversifying Iran’s foreign trade, merely increasing exchanges with China is not enough.
India, Russia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other members of the group each have different markets and capacities, and expanding trade with them can reduce the excessive concentration of Iran’s trade on a few limited partners.
Of course, India’s situation is different from China’s. Trade between Iran and India in recent years has been limited under the influence of sanctions and secondary pressure from the United States, and bilateral trade, compared with the capacity of the two economies, is far below the expected level. Reuters, in an August report, also reported a decline in India-Iran trade under US pressure and described India’s trade with Iran as mainly limited to certain food and pharmaceutical items.
From this perspective, Iran’s presence at the India summit was an opportunity to redefine this very trade relationship—not only at the Tehran–Delhi level, but within the broader BRICS framework.
* Iran can turn from a “Market” into a “Trade Route”
Iran’s capacity within BRICS is not limited to goods exports. The country’s geographical position, especially in connecting Russia and northern Eurasia to southern waters and the Indian market, is another important advantage.
Before the trip to India, too, the economy minister had described strengthening the North–South Corridor, along with developing financial and trade cooperation with Russia, as among the axes of the government’s economic diplomacy.
The Mehr reporter’s conversation with economic actors confirmed this point: this issue is particularly important from a trade perspective, because if Iran can simultaneously be a producer, exporter, and transit route, the economic value of BRICS membership for the country will multiply.
If Iran can simultaneously be a producer, exporter, and transit route, the economic value of BRICS membership for the country will multiply.
According to economic actors, in such a model, goods are not only exported from Iran to a BRICS member state; rather, part of the trade among BRICS members can also pass through Iran.
The North–South Corridor gains particular importance here, because India, as one of BRICS’s major economies, needs diverse routes to access the Russian and Eurasian markets, and Iran enjoys a privileged geographical position in this regard.
Despite all these capacities, one reality should not be overlooked: BRICS membership does not by itself create trade.
The experience of other members also shows that even trade among BRICS countries, despite notable growth, faces structural obstacles; for example, India’s trade with BRICS has grown in recent years, but India’s trade deficit with the group reached about $226 billion in fiscal year 2026—a matter showing that increased trade does not necessarily mean balanced trade or equal benefits for members.
Economic actors believe that for Iran, too, the issue is not only increasing the trade figure; rather, it must be seen what effect this trade will have on non-oil exports, imports of raw materials and machinery, investment, technology transfer, and foreign exchange income.
In this framework, if BRICS merely leads to an increase in Iran’s imports from member states, it cannot be considered a trade success. The main goal should be creating greater balance, increasing exports with higher added value, and attracting capital for export-oriented production.
If BRICS merely leads to an increase in Iran’s imports from member states, it cannot be considered a trade success. The main goal should be creating greater balance, increasing exports with higher added value, and attracting capital for export-oriented production.
Iran’s presence at this year’s BRICS summit came as the global economic atmosphere is more than ever affected by sanctions, trade war, financial restrictions, and disruption of transportation routes.
At the same time, the Iran–US war and developments in the Strait of Hormuz have confronted BRICS itself with an unprecedented test. Reuters has reported that the current crisis has even affected trade relations between two BRICS members, Iran and the UAE, and that the UAE has halted trade with Iran since August.
This development makes one important point clear to Iran: BRICS is not yet a free trade area or an integrated economic union. Its members have different and sometimes conflicting interests, and it cannot be expected that mere membership in this group will remove Iran’s trade restrictions.
But this very reality makes the importance of Iran’s economic negotiations within this framework greater.
If Iran can use BRICS’s capacity to create payment routes, use local currencies, finance projects, develop transit corridors, and expand trade agreements, membership in this group can turn from a diplomatic achievement into a real tool of foreign trade.
Otherwise, despite BRICS’s multi-trillion-dollar market, an important part of the capacity of this membership will remain on paper.
Therefore, merely being large cannot by itself help improve Iran’s trade process; rather, it must be seen what share of this bloc’s trade Iran can obtain and, more importantly, through what mechanism it can move the money generated by this trade, and even more importantly, that BRICS moves from the level of political statements to the level of contracts, payments, investment, and the real flow of goods.
MA
